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Boggs: Executive Impoundment of Congressionally Appropriated Funds

EXECUTIVE IMPOUNDMENT OF CONGRESSIONALLY
APPROPRIATED FUNDS
HALE Bocms*

The American government, organized by a functional separation of
powers, is deeply rooted in both philosophical precedent and historical experience. The proposition that power should not be concentrated in a single
governing body long predates the American Constitution. The concept can
be traced to Aristotle who differentiated between the legislative, executive,
and judicial functions.1 Succeeding generations of political thinkers elaborated upon the doctrine of separation of powers, and the idea became familiar
to the American colonists largely through Montesquieu,2 whose work was
freely drawn upon by James Madison. Through Madison, the doctrine of
separation of powers became one of the pillars of the United States. Constitution.3

The separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers by the
first three articles of the Constitution reflected a pervasive distrust of centralized government. The system of checks and balances by which the powers
of each branch were defined and delimited was intended to provide each with
"the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroach'4
ments of the others.
The three coordinate branches of the federal government share the
primary means of implementing national goals. They are co-equal in the
sense that no branch is permitted to dominate the others. They perform their
respective functions by cooperation rather than by competition. How these
respective and cooperative powers are to be exercised within such a framework is a question of paramount importance; the commitment to limited,
shared powers has been tested and strained by a myriad of conditions throughout American history.
Since 1787, events have often brought preeminence to one branch to the
temporary disadvantage of the others. Madison showed early foresight into
this problem when he wrote:6

OBA. 1937, LL.B. 1937, Tulane University; United States Representative from Louisiana;
Majority Leader, United States House of Representatives. The author wishes to thank
Rose E. Polito, Esquire, and Richard R. Rivers, members of his staff, for their assistance
in the preparation of this article.
1. Forkosch, The Separation of Powers, 41 U. CoLo. L. Rxv. 529 (1969).
2. In his influencing treatise Montesquieu cautioned: "When the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there
can be no liberty .... Again, there is no liberty if the judiciary be not separated from the
legislative and executive." M. MoNzSQurEu, THE Sp'mrr oF LAws 113 (6th ed. T. Nugent
transl. 1793).
3. Hazo,Montesquieu and the Separationof Powers, 54 A.B.A.J. 665, 720 (1968).
4. TnE FDERAu- No. 51, at 265 (B. Blackwell ed. 1948) (Madison).
5. Id. No. 48, at 247.
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[W]here the whole power of one department is exercised by the same
hands which possess the whole power of another department, the
fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.
In modern times, the executive has been accused of augmenting its power
at the expense of Congress.6 The most extreme examples have been the wide
spectrum of powers assumed by Presidents in times of war.7 Other areas in
which the executive has expropriated power include the control of public
lands and property, federal contracts, the stockpiling program, and the
"executive privilege" doctrine." Many of these executive powers had their
inception as "temporary" congressional grants of power for use during national
emergencies. In practice, however, these powers have been permitted to exist
long after the emergency subsided-long enough to become entrenched in
administrative custom.
THE HISTORY OF THE IMPOUNDMENT PROCESS

That Congress has not acted to correct these encroachments lends no
support to the argument that the executive has permanently acquired the
authority.9 In the mid-twentieth century, the most common usurpation of
legislative power has been the executive impoundment of funds duly authorized and appropriated by Congress. 10 This procedure, in which the President
refuses to disburse funds appropriated by the Congress for a given purpose

6.

See, e.g., E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957

NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER

(1957);

R.

(1960); A. SCHLESINGER, JR. & A. DE GRAZIA, CONGRESS AND

THE PRESIDENCY: THEIR ROLE IN MODERN TIMES (1967).
7. See Stassen, Separation of Powers and the Uncommon Defense: The Case Against
Impounding of Weapons Systems Appropriations, 57 GEO. L.J. 1159 (1969).
8. Miller, Presidential Power To Impound Appropriated Funds: An Exercise in Constitutional Decision-Making, 43 N.C.L. REV. 402, 519-21 (1965). On January 19, 1971, President Nixon impounded the funds appropriated for building the Cross Florida Barge Canal.
This construction halt, although praised by environmentalists, has been greatly criticized
as an unconstitutional act by numerous Florida legislators.
9. Joseph Cooper, Chairman of the Political Science Department, Rice University, remarked: "The fact that the executive may regard impoundment as a convenience and
even essential means of achievement widely agreed upon policy objectives . . . does not
mean that it is a legal one." 117 CONG. REC. 7855 (daily ed. May 26, 1971) (inserted into
record by Sen. Sam. J. Ervin, Jr. (D. N.C.)).
10. Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D. N.C.) commented in a recent Senate hearing: "Impounding-or reserving, freezing, withholding, sequestering, depending on semantic choiceis not a new concept and when undertaken for proper purposes, it may be quite useful
in effective economy.
"However, impoundment unfortunately occurs under circumstances when the executive
branch, for reasons of its own, wishes to avoid expending sums which Congress has explicitly directed to be spent for some particular purpose. It is this situation which poses
a threat to our system of government which so patently violates the separation of powers
principle." Hearings on Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. 1-2 (1971).
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during a given fiscal year, has been the source of growing friction between
the executive and legislative branches."
The tenuous line separating presidential and congressional power is
patently strained by impoundment. Less obvious, perhaps, are the causes,
consequences, solutions, and constitutional, political and strategic implications
inherent in the problem. The gravamen of the issue is the power of the
peoples' representatives, both congressional and presidential. One must question the President's authority and capacity to assume effective control of the
nation's purse strings through impoundment, an area constitutionally reserved
to the legislative branch. Article I of the Constitution expressly delegates
the fiscal authority to the Congress. Section 8 of the Constitution states: "The
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common defence and general
Welfare of the United States." Unfortunately, the questions raised by impoundment are not answered adequately by the express language of the
Constitution.
Presidential withholding of funds is not new. The first case of any
importance occurred in 1803 when President Jefferson refused to spend
50,000 dollars appropriated by Congress for gunboats on the Mississippi
River.' 2 The first development in impoundment as we know it today occurred
in 1921 with the formation of the Budget Bureau. The Bureau's first director,
Charles E. Dawes, justified impoundments through the Anti-Deficiency Acts
of 1905-190613 and the powers granted him under the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921.14 Dawes, however, employed a far narrower concept of impoundment than that embraced today. In creating reserve funds in the Treasury,
Dawes merely said that an agency was not required to spend its full appropriation if it could fulfill its objectives by spending less.' 5
In 1933 President Roosevelt transferred "the function[s] of 'making,
waiving and modifying apportionments of appropriations.' "16 Thereafter,
the Budget Bureau instituted the practice of impounding funds appropriated
for specific purposes. During the Franklin Roosevelt era, impoundments first
came under widespread challenge. On August 18, 1942, in a letter to the late
Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, President Roosevelt stated: "[Tjhe mere
fact that Congress has made available specific sums for the various programs
and functions of the government is not a mandate that such funds be fully
11. "We cannot allow, however, the President or the Executive branch to have an
informal line item veto of appropriated money which cannot be overridden by the Congress. This is in effect to impound declared congressional policy and threatens Congress'
very existence. This is clearly in violation of the spirit and intent of our Constitution."
Hearings on Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1971)
(remarks of Senator Charles McC. Mathias (D. Md.)).
12. Oishi, The Constitution: Who Spends the Money? The Sun (Baltimore, Md.), April
5, 1971.

13. 31 U.S.C. §665 (1970).
14. 31 U.S.C. §§1-60 (1970).
15. 117 CONG. REc. 7854-55 (daily ed. May 26, 1971).
16. Id. at 7855.
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expended."17 In 1943 various members of Congress attempted to assert legislative authority over spending by imposing restrictions on the impoundment
of funds. Senator Kenneth McKellar (D. Tenn.) won the approval of the
Senate Appropriations Committee to attach a rider to this effect on the
National Defense Appropriations bill. The rider, which passed the Senate,
was later removed from the bill but was the first significant effort in Congress
to curtail executive impoundment18
Toward the end of World War II and in the immediate post-war period,
the impoundment device proved useful in cutting back appropriations no
longer required for the maintenance of the war. Accordingly, Congress took
a less critical view of impoundment. The Employment Act of 1946, for
example, formally acknowledged the executive's primary responsibility for
maintaining economic stability. Although the Act did not address the question, a tacit approval has been inferred from the statute's stated goal of
policies intended to "avoid economic fluctuations."1 9
THE EXECUTIVE ARGUMENT
The most often cited event as authority for executive impoundment
occurred in 1950 when a rider attached to the Omnibus Appropriations Act
of 1951 passed the Congress. 2° The statute amended the Anti-Deficiency Act
2
of 1905-1906 by stating: 1

In apportioning any appropriations, reserves may be established to
provide for contingencies or to effect savings whenever savings are
made possible through changes in requirements, greater efficiency of
operations, or other developments subsequent to the date on which
such apportionment was made available.
Even as amended, it is difficult to understand how any interpretation of
this language gave the then existing Bureau of the Budget unlimited discretion to impound. The wide powers implicitly granted by this statute are
17. Ramsey, Impoundment by the Executive Department of Funds Which Congress
Has Authorized It To Spend or Obligate, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVIc E, May 10, 1968, at 3.
President Roosevelt's letter to Senator Russell stated: "While our statutory system of fund
apportionment is not a substitute for item or blanket veto power, and should not be used
to set aside or nullify the expressed will of Congress, I cannot believe that you or Congress
as a whole would take exception to either of these purposes which are common to sound
business management everywhere. In other words, the mere fact that Congress, by the appropriation process, has made available specified sums for the various programs and functions of the government is not a mandate that such funds must be fully expended. Such
a premise would take from the Chief Executive every incentive for good management and
the practice of commonsense economy." Id. at 20-21.
18. Williams, The Inter-University Case Program-The Impounding of Funds by the
Bureau of the Budget (published by University of Ala. Press, Nov. 1955).
19. 117 CONG. REc. 3959-60 (daily ed. March 29, 1971) (inserted into record by Sen. Allen
J. Ellender (D. La.)).
20. Hearings on Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951 Before the Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Appropriations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47, 120-21, 233-34 (1950).
21. 31 U.S.C. §665 (c) (2) (1970).
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thought to permit far greater Presidential control over appropriated funds
than Congress intended to surrender.
The executive branch has argued that it has the ultimate responsibility
for enforcing spending ceilings established by Congress. In 1970, however,
the House Appropriations Committee specifically negated any notion that
it was granting authority for impoundment of appropriated funds in imposing a budgetary ceiling.22 The Committeee was not seeking to advance a
vehicle for arbitrary broad cutbacks that would enable the executive branch
to allocate and reduce funds appropriated to specific agencies and programs.
The Committee's purpose was to focus on the totality of federal spending
and to permit adjustments only by Congress.
It has been further asserted that article II, section 3, of the Constitution
encompasses the impounding power, yet no serious contention can be rightfully made that the President's power as Commander-in-Chief could confer
on him the power to impound funds beyond the military sphere, if even
there he has such power.23 The Constitution specifically reserves to Congress
the right "to raise and support the Armies" and "to provide and maintain a
Navy." The specific powers and functions of the Executive as Commander-inChief of the Army were left undefined, making this clause the source of
considerable power and the origin of more than one serious controversy in
American history.
Increasingly, administrations have justified impoundments by citing fifty
years of precedents, none of which have any firm basis in statutory law or
the Constitution. As a result, more funds are under impoundment today than
at any other time in history. The executive rationale of impoundment was
Deputy Director of
exemplified by the statement of Caspar W. Weinberger,
24
the newly-created Office of Management and Budget:
In addition to this specific authority provided by the Anti-Deficiency
Act, authority for the President to establish reserves is derived basically
from the Constitutional provisions which vest the executive power in
the President.
Most often it is the general provision of Article II that the President "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" which authorizes
and occasionally requires that the President withhold funds. In addition to these general provisions, however, brief mention should be
made of the specific provisions of Article I, Section 2, which designates

22. "The administration has attached high priority to quality of performance in administering the government. Wasteful and needless expenditures do not become so until
funds are poorly managed. The primary burden of getting a dollar's value for every
dollar justifiably appropriated to the purposes of the government lies mainly with those
who administer, not those who legislate." Hearings on Second Supplemental Appropriation
Bill of 1970 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 753-90 (1970).
23. See Stassen, supra note 7, at 1184.
24. Hearings on Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds Before the Subcomm.
on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 95-96
(1971).
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the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and gives
him responsibility for negotiating treaties and conducting foreign
affairs.
Mr. Weinberger went on to say: 25
[The] President must, for example, bear in mind that the Congress
has placed a limit upon the public debt and that expenditures must be
managed in such a fashion as not to require borrowing which would
exceed the limit ....
Mr. Weinberger indicates these actions are taken by the President in order
to restrict government spending and thereby repel inflationary pressures.
IMPOUNDMENTS ON THE UPRISE

Even though impoundment spans half a century, Professor Joseph Cooper
of Rice University has asserted that since 1950 presidential impoundments
"have expanded so greatly as to establish virtually a qualitative difference
between executive contentions before and after that date." 26 The following
table, based on information supplied by the Office of Management and
27
Budgets, illustrates the rising incidence of impoundment:
AMOUNT OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS IMPOUNDED BY THE
WHITE HOUSE AS OF JUNE EACH YEAR

EISENHOWER
KENNEDY

1959

$ 6.9

billion

1960

8.0 billion

1961

7.6 billion

1962
1963

6.5 billion
4.5 billion

JOHNSON

1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

4.2
5.6
8.7
10.6
9.9

billion
billion
billion
billion
billion

NIXON

1969
1970
1971

9.6 billion
11.5 billion
12.8 billion

Commenting on the current impoundments, House Speaker Carl Albert
(D. Okla.) has said that the Administration is thwarting the will of Congress
by "executive fiat" and "that the Administration should live up to its own
rhetoric and release these important funds forthwith." 28 A considerable por25. Id. at 96.
26. 117 CONG. RiEc. 7855 (daily ed. May 26, 1971).
27. Why Nixon Refuses To Spend Billions Voted by Congress, U.S. NEws & Woau.
REP., April 19, 1971, at 43.
28. Id. at 42.
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don of the money put in reserves by the present Administration was earmarked for public works acceleration intended to stimulate the economy in
hard-core unemployment areas. One must seriously question the right of the
executive to determine national priorities and goals over contrary congressional expression.
Among the major federal programs affected by the present Administration
29
were:
Highway building
Low-rent public housing
Navy shipbuilding
Airports, aviation facilities
Model cities
Foreign aid, military and economic
Military construction

$

6.3
942.0
957.0
862.0
383.0
360.0
235.0

billion
million
million
million
million
million
million

Senator Allen J. Ellender (D. La.), one of the most experienced members
of Congress and Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, has
stated:30
Congress has approved the use of these funds for the benefit of our
people. The President is saying they shall not be used for that purpose.
We have an argument, not over a program, but over a long-range policy.
SEPARATION OF POWERS

The ConstitutionalQuestion
The framers of our Constitution favored the people and their representatives with the power to control the Treasury.3' One writer in the field of
2
executive impoundment, Louis Fisher, has said:3
A Constitutional issue emerges only when Congress finds a legislative
program cancelled or abbreviated because the President considers the
purpose unwise, wasteful or inexpedient. He then no longer operates
on the basis of legislative authority ....
The PoliticalQuestion - Legislative Action
Can strong constitutional arguments that only Congress controls our
Nation's purse strings be outweighed by the executive branch's questionable
practices in the field of fiscal management? Is interference with lawful appropriations tantamount to illegal action? Is this a political question that must
be answered on political grounds?

29.

117 CoNG. Ri . 7856 (daily ed. May 26, 1971).

80. Glass, Washington - U.S.A., Money Games Presidents Play, TIE NEw LEADER, May
3, 1971, at 7.
31. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §9, provides in part: "No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . "
32. Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President, the Constitutional Issue, 38 GEo. WASH.
L. Ray. 124, 125-26 (1969).
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Congress has yet to devise and implement effective controls over impoundment. What is needed is a means of striking a balance between administrative
discretion over spending while denying the executive unlimited power over
the public purse.
Many economists have suggested that impoundment exists solely for
efficiency purposes in order to manage and adjust our modern burgeoning
economy. The fundamental question of the executive's impoundment authority will remain unresolved until it is decided whether the ultimate responsibility for controlling inflation rests with the Congress or the President.
There is a thin line where efficiency ends and the infringement of the constitutional powers of each branch begins.
Ultimately it appears that impoundment is primarily a delicate political
question that must be resolved in the political arena. 33 Democratic leaders
in the House have made the issue one of the major political themes in the
1972 election. The issue reached the House floor on April 27, 1971, when
House Majority Whip Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (D. Mass.) introduced a joint
resolution instructing President Nixon to release forthwith all impounded
monies.34
Similar action has ensued in the Senate. Senator Sam Ervin (D. N.C.),
on June 9, 1971, introduced legislation "[t]o insure the separation of federal
powers by requiring the President to notify Congress whenever he impounds
funds, or authorizes the impounding of funds, and by providing a procedure
under which the Senate and House of Representatives may disapprove the
President's action."

35

As to what further congressional action will be taken to stop impoundments, Senator Hubert Humphrey (D. Minn.) stated in a recent interview
with the National Journal:36
What is happening is another one of those great periodic reviews
that involve a basic redistribution of power between the President
and the legislature.
I don't have any immediate answer. We have no firm blueprint.
We'll just have to try out one form of pressure and, if that doesn't
work, we'll have to try another.
It's one thing, you know, to temporarily withhold funds. But it's
quite another to cancel them - to impose their will over that of the
people's elected representatives.
Should the judiciary decide the issue? Many legislators are reluctant to
relinquish final authority to the courts because they consider it solely the
prerogative of Congress to decide how the problem should ultimately be
solved. Historically, the courts have never had occasion to weigh and decide
the exact question of the President's authority to withhold funds appropriated
33. Id. at 136-37.
34. H.R.J. Res. 577, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
35. S. 2027, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
36. 117 CONG. Rxc. 7851 (daily ed. May 26, 1971) (inserted into the record by Sen.
Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D. N.C.)).
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for public purposes. The broad issue as to whether an appropriation is a
mandate to spend or merely permission to spend has been subjected to only
37
limited judicial scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
38
Arthur Selwyn Miller, a noted presidential scholar, has stated:

[T]he President can and may withhold expenditures of funds to the
extent that the political milieu in which he operates permits him to
do so.
While the role of the Congress in American government is evolving and
changing it must resist the trend to political impotence that other nations
have experienced. The United States Congress stands as one of the foremost
legislative institutions in the entire world and, for it to remain intact, it must
withstand the influence of the executive power. The President cannot validly
claim, as some have argued, that authority to impound is derived from the
duty to see that the "laws are faithfully executed." It is, in fact, in contravention of the expression of the will of Congress that impoundment occurs, as
Congress has the vested authority to enact our laws. The argument that the
power to impound is inherent in the powers of the office is even weaker. The
President's constitutional duty to oversee the faithful execution of laws enacted by Congress does not confer upon him the unquestionable discretion
to determine what laws shall be executed and what appropriated funds
should be expended.39
In dosing, the writings of James Madison should again be noted:40
It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one
of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments. It is equally evident, that
neither of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling
influence over the others in the administration of their respective
powers. It will not be denied, that power is of an encroaching nature,
and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits
assigned to it. After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several
classes of power, as they may in their nature be legislative, executive,
or judiciary; the next, and most difficult task, is to provide some
practical security for each, against the invasion of the others. What
this security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved.

37. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); McKay v. Central Elec. Power Co-op.,
223 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Compagna v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 316 (1891); Hukill
v. United States, 16 Ct. Cl. 562, 565 (1880).
38. Miller, supra note 8, at 533.
39. Goostree, The Power of the President To Impound Appropriated Funds: With
Special Reference to Grants-in-Aid to Segregated Activities, 11 Am.U.L. REv. 32 (1962).
40. THE FEDERALisT, No. 48, at 252 (B. Blackwell ed. 1948) (Madison) (emphasis added).
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